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This dissertation aims to provide an independent view of the future of FedEx Corporation. Despite the 
recent sell-off after ground margins fell short of investors' expectations, FedEx is benefiting from 
interesting trends across all the business segments. Those trends include the shift towards online 
shopping accelerated by the pandemic, a recovery in the economy around the world and the constraint 
of passenger capacity. Therefore, this report points towards a buy recommendation with a target price 
of $286.50 as of December 31st, 2021, translating into an 11.4% total shareholder return over the next 
12-months. 
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This report is part of the “The Logistic Giant Emerge Amid the Pandemic – The Outstanding Case of 
FedEx Corporation” report (annexed) and should be read as an integral part of it. 
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▪ FedEx Express  
After a tough year, with the pandemic and a costly TNT integration, we expect a sharp express 
margins recovery in the short-term. The integration of TNT (expected to be concluded by FY22) 
and the services optimization across FedEx segments (with the ground lower cost structure 
bearing some of Express package volume) will contribute positively to a margin improvement. In 
our perspective, with TNT, FedEx will have the best opportunity to enhance its margins in Europe. 
Furthermore, as B2B transactions recover so does the Express margins. Lastly, most of the 
world’s cargo is guaranteed by passenger planes and those were interrupted by the current 
pandemic. Along with the fact that we expect air cargo demand to recover faster than passenger 
capacity (FY21 vs FY23/24), it will enable FedEx to keep gaining pricing power. For the long-
term, the strategy is to focus on small and medium business (rather than resellers) that will keep 
longer relations with FedEx even after the full passenger capacity recover. In our opinion, these 
factors will contribute for a 9.1% sustainable FedEx Express margin. 
We expect the salaries and employee benefits to be 38.5% of express total revenues in FY21 
and, afterwards, slowly decrease to 37.5%, as FedEx fully integrates TNT and see its investments 
paying off. With Boeing 757 and Boeing 767-300F being added to the fleet, in FY08 and FY13, 
respectively, FedEx started demonstrating a commitment to reduce energy consumption and gas 
emission. The latter one has reduced the operating costs by 20% when compared to the old 
aircraft. Besides the addition of more fuel- and cost-efficient airplanes, FedEx Express improved 
the in-flight planning and adopted other strategies to reduce fuel costs and gas emission. Note 
also that FedEx hedges fuel cost through surcharges indexed to fuel prices. Although oil prices 
reached the bottom line during the pandemic, with all FedEx investments and changes, we 
forecast this cost to represent 6.9% (as a % of express revenues) in the long-run, higher than in 
FY21 (6.5%) but lower than in the past. 
Other costs, such as purchase transportation and rental expenses, are either expected to 
maintain or slightly decrease as a % of revenues to reflect the margin improvement.  
To sum up, FedEx Express margins are expected to recover in FY21 to reflect all the opportunities 
mainly in the international environment (7.6%). Afterwards, the improvement in margins is 
sustainable for the foreseeable period, reaching an 9.1% operating margin by FY27 and 
maintaining during the remaining forecasting period. Although our long-term margin expectation 
is lower when compared to the Wall Street consensus1, we prefer to be caution on our estimate 
as there still is a lot of uncertainty on the pace of air passenger recovery and on FedEx ability to 
sustain double-digit margin for this segment after the end of the constraint capacity.  
▪ FedEx Ground 
The pandemic raised restrictions to physical shopping, thus, the boom in e-commerce led to 
increasing demand for residential deliveries. In this regard, FedEx Ground is investing in order to 
turn ground operations more efficient and increase margins. Firstly, FedEx implemented 7-day 
week delivery to increase firm’s capacity and smooth the logistics process, thus, currently, FedEx 
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Graph 1: FedEx Express Operating 
Performance 
Source: Own Estimates 
an autonomous robot that replaces USPS in last-mile deliveries, enabling more cost-efficient 
shipments. Thirdly, the FedEx SmartPost is being integrated within FedEx Ground network, 
increasing its density and diluting fixed costs per package by 9% in 2Q21 (YoY). In line with this, 
FedEx Ground has been investing in both internal partnerships to handle the peak demand, 
namely with FedEx Express to deliver certain packages and with FedEx Freight to transport 
heavier packages, and in external partnerships with well-established retail firms as Dollar General 
and Walmart to increase drop-off/pick-up locations. 
Therefore, assuming a broader and dense network, we believe that FedEx Ground will become 
more cost-efficient, thus, we forecast margin improvements until FY31. The SmartPost integration 
within FedEx Ground implies the expansion of ground network with 28 SmartPost facilities, thus, 
we estimate the rental costs to increase in the short-term (from $989 million in FY20 to $1 243 
million in FY23), tending to 3.8% of ground revenues by FY31.  
Concerning salaries and employee benefits, we estimate them to be 18.3% of ground revenues 
until FY22, ranging from $4 881million in FY21 to $5 335 million in FY22. This is explained by the 
fact that we believe that FedEx will increase its workforce in the near-term and we do not expect 
FedEx Ground will lay off the 70 000 employees hired last year to overcome e-commerce “rush” 
and holiday peak. From FY24 onwards, we forecast this caption to decrease in percentage of 
sales, reaching 17% of ground revenues in FY31. On the other hand, we will keep purchased 
transportation at 47.5% and 47% of revenues until FY23, due to the increased independent 
services providers contracts settled to deal with the ground volume expansion. Thereafter, these 
costs will tend to 45.5% of revenues by FY31. Note that when comparing with UPS, which relies 
more on its own workforce, FedEx registers lower costs with salaries as percentage of revenues 
since it subcontracts independent drivers.  
Consequently, although the decrease in ground’s operating margin to 8.9% in FY20, we expect 
a fast margin recovery from FY21 onwards. As we believe that B2C transactions will dominate 
the market, we estimate the operating margin to be 10.8% by FY23, because these transactions 
are less profitable to FedEx as they imply raising costs to increase substantially the volume. 
However, FedEx aims to improve efficiency in this regard, thus, it has been investing in a broaden 
and consolidated FedEx Ground network to raise operating margin. On the other hand, from FY24 
onwards, we expect FedEx Ground margins to recover to levels prior to the pandemic, reaching 
13.9% by FY31, mostly due to the recovery of B2B transactions, which are more profitable to 
FedEx Ground. 
Within the ground segment, FedEx has the higher operating margin compared to UPS and DHL, 
since in FY19 FedEx reached 13% of ground operating margin, while UPS (US Domestic 
Package) and DHL (Post and Parcel) reached 9% and 8%, respectively. As this trend has been 
sustained throughout the latest years, we expect FedEx to keep the highest operating margin as 
it has been the most efficient logistics firm providing ground services.  
▪ FedEx Freight 
FedEx Freight strategy relies on enhancing revenue quality through processes optimization and 
cost reduction measures. Following the pandemic, we believe that FY21 will be an abnormal year 
for FedEx Freight whose significant recovery is justified by its collaboration with FedEx Ground 
to deliver bulkier packages to residences during the pandemic. Therefore, in general, in FY21, 
we estimate operating expenses to decrease as percentage of revenues due to the decline in 
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Graph 2: FedEx Ground Operating 
Performance 
Source: Own Estimates 
prior levels near 4.5% of revenues, in line with 2Q21 results and the low oil prices associated with 
the decline in services provided to businesses. Consequently, FedEx Freight operating margin 
will reach 12.9% in FY21. 
From FY21 onwards, we consider that FedEx Freight will approach last years’ performance and 
decrease costs in percentage of freight revenues until FY31 as efficiency increases. Regarding 
fuel costs, as we believe that FY21 was an one-off year, we estimate fuel costs to increase from 
$320 million to $502 million in FY22 to further reach 6.7% to 6.5% of revenues until FY31, as we 
do not expect oil prices to remain as low as during the pandemic.  
Accordingly, we forecast FedEx Freight operating margin to reach 12.1% by FY31, reflecting the 
increasing cost efficiency and productivity gain throughout the years.  
▪ FedEx Services, Other and Elimination  
This business segment will comprise ShopRunner activity, thus, we estimate slightly higher costs 
with salaries and amortization from FY21 onwards (97% and ranging from 20.7% to 16.1% of 
revenues until FY31, respectively).  
Nonetheless, as a residual FedEx’s segment, we forecast this business unit considering the past 
trend and the need to balance each business unit costs with the consolidated statement. Hence, 
due to the adjustments in elimination caption, we estimate an operating margin ranging from -
36.1% to -25.9% until FY31.  
▪ Operating Margins Summary 
To sum up, FedEx management team targets a double-digit margin for the future years. However, 
we believe that FedEx will tend to a lower figure, reaching 9.5% operating margin by FY31. This 
operating margin improvement is mostly associated with efficiency gains and scale effects within 
Express segment as well as with ground margin recovery. However, there is still a lot of 
uncertainty regarding the express margin after the end of the constraint international airfreight 
and the trajectory of the ground margin with the new online shopping habits, with the management 
team not providing any guidance for ground margin in the last quarter. 
Net Working Capital Requirements (NWCR) 
We forecast all the components of the NWCR as a number of days, except operating cash that 
we forecast to be 2% of revenues, as it is a good proxy of the amount that firms need, on average, 
to run their core business2. 
During FY20, customers were given more days to pay its credits since COVID-19 crises put 
pressure on liquidity in general. However, we do not expect this to occur in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, we forecast this caption to be back to pre-COVID levels (48 days), closer to the number of 
days of its main peers (UPS and DHL), and to slightly decrease to 47 days later in the future 
(FY25), as FedEx becomes more efficient in collecting from its clients, converging to past levels 
and UPS figures.  
We forecast the other operating current assets (spare parts, supplies and fuel, and prepaid 
expenses and others) to be the same as in the past since it is a standard when comparing to its 
closer peers (UPS and DHL). We expect to slightly decrease over the years, as we do not expect 
any meaningful changes in the industry and in FedEx’s policies in this regard. 
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FY18 FY19 FY20 FY18 FY19 FY18 FY19
Accounts Receivables 
(Days)
47 48 53 45 47 49 49
Inventories (Days) 10 10 10 13 15 12 11
Other Current Assets 
(Days)
6 6 4 4 5 14 15
UPS DHLFedEx
Table 1: Operating Current Assets in Days 
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Graph 5: FedEx Operating Performance 
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Graph 4: FedEx Services, Other and 
Elimination Operating Performance 
Source: Own Estimates 
The number of days that it takes FedEx to pay to its suppliers is almost a third (55 in FY19) when 
compared to UPS (164 in FY19) and DHL (181 in FY19). However, the mix of business among 
these three firms is different. For example, FedEx has a much higher proportion of express-type 
of service (51.3% in FY20) and less ground-based deliveries when compared to UPS. 
Consequently, FedEx is more capital intensive, spending more on fuel, landing fees and rental 
expense, and it depends more on sub-contractors, while UPS has its own labor force. For those 
reasons, FedEx has fewer days, on average, to pay its suppliers and we do not expect major 
changes in the future. Therefore, we estimate the average payable period to remain relatively 
stable, with a small increase in the forecast in line with all the efforts FedEx has made to become 
more efficient and improve their supplier policies. 
Lastly, we assume that the number of days it takes for FedEx to pay its employees for their 
monthly work to remain stable in 23 days, as this is the new trend for the sector. If we look at 
UPS, it has also paid its employees in 24 days during 2019, instead of paying for their monthly 
work in the next month as in the past. Lastly, we estimate accrued expenses to converge to past 
levels, following past recovery trends.  
In conclusion, FedEx has the worst cash conversion cycle when compared to UPS and DHL. This 
can be justified by the fact that FedEx has a different mix of business, with higher proportion of 
express-type services and less ground-based deliveries, that mainly affects the number of day it 
takes for FedEx to pay its suppliers. Nevertheless, with the new strategy to become more efficient, 
FedEx has some margin to converge the net working capital, but we do not believe it will fully 
catch up that of UPS and DHL.  
To sum up, we assume the net working capital to be 5.8% of revenues in the first years and to 
converge to 5.2% at the end of the forecasting period. 
Capital Expenditures (CapEx) 
FedEx is a capital-intensive firm due to the reliance on the Express segment that owns an 
extensive aircraft fleet. Consequently, compared to its peers, FedEx is more dependent on fixed 
assets to generate revenues with 44% of net PP&E as percentage of revenues by FY19 (UPS 
40% and DHL 34% by FY19). However, regarding capital expenditures, FedEx’s investments are 
slightly lower than its peers (with $5 564 million compared to UPS $5 981 million and DHL $5 922 
million in FY19). 
According to firm’s recent announcements and the pandemic economic effects, FedEx will 
decrease its capital expenditure (as a % of revenues) in the following years. On the one hand, 
FedEx has already made significant investments to increase its network coverage to 95% of the 
US population. On the other hand, due to the current pandemic, the firm will postpone larger 
investments in facilities and focus on smaller investments to increase capacity and capabilities to 
help FedEx smoothing its logistics process during peak, mainly to smooth ground services. At the 
same time, FedEx has been acquiring appropriate equipment for residential deliveries to handle 
non-conveyable packages.  
FedEx Express is the operating segment with the major weight on FedEx business, then, aircrafts 
and related equipment also corresponds to the majority of net PP&E. Following FedEx's fleet 
investment plan, we believe that the total fleet pounds and the cost per thousand pounds are the 
best drivers to assess the value of aircrafts and equipment throughout the years. Note that, within 
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Graph 7: Net Working Capital Requirements 
Forecast  
Source: Own Estimates 
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY18 FY19 FY18 FY19
Accounts Payable (Days) 58 55 59 158 164 183 181
Accrued Wages (Days) 33 26 23 30 24 31 33
FedEx UPS DHL
Table 2: Operating Current Liabilities in 
Days 
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Operating Current Assets ($m) Operating Current Liabilities ($m)
Graph 6: Operating Current Assets vs 
Operating Current Liabilities Forecast 
Source: Own Estimates 
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY18 FY19 FY18 FY19
Working Capital (Days) 17 22 24 6 9 3 4
UPS DHLFedEx
Table 3: Cash Conversion Cycle 





































































FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31
Net PP&E ($m) Other Intangible Assets ($m)
Graph 8: Fixed Assets Forecast  
Source: Own Estimates 
the inefficient aircrafts A310, as announced in FedEx 2020 Annual Report.  
Moreover, the boom in e-commerce has been accelerating the investment in ground equipment 
to smooth the residential deliveries network. As a consequence, we estimate package handling 
and ground support equipment to evolve as percentage of package and ground revenues, so that 
in the next three years the investment in this regard is intensified (from $4 499 million in FY20 to 
$5 410 million FY23). On the other hand, besides the expected increase in ground facilities due 
to SmartPost integration and the plans to open more cold chain facilities (adding to the 90 already 
existent across the world) to deal with critical shipments, FedEx announced a $1.5 billion 
expansion in FedEx Express Indianapolis hub as well as a $1.5 billion investment to modernize 
the FedEx Express Memphis World hub. As a result, we forecast the net value of facilities and 
other to be driven by FedEx Ground and Express revenues, evolving from $7 043 million in FY20 
to $9 861 million in FY25. The remaining PP&E will evolve at a similar percentage of revenues 
as past years, while other intangible assets (net) will be 0.6% of revenues throughout the forecast, 
in line with the past three years.  
Regarding depreciation costs and considering the stable trend verified until the present, we 
forecast them to be a constant percentage equal to the average of the past three years until FY31, 
corresponding to 11.7% of the prior year PP&E and other intangibles. 
Therefore, in FY21, FedEx will decrease its CapEx to $5.1 billion (vs $6.7 billion in FY20) as 
announced in 2Q2021 earnings call, while we estimate an increase in CapEx by FY22 up to $5.6 
billion, due to the investments in the ground facilities and equipment to accommodate the e-
commerce growth and automate last-mile deliveries. Thereafter, we believe that CapEx will range 
from 7.3% to 6.2% of revenues, reaching $6.8 billion by FY31.  
In terms of operating leases, following the US GAAP ASC 842 standard, we adjusted the past 
FedEx’s balance sheets to capitalize the operating leases through their recognition as both an 
asset and a debt equivalent. By doing so, we are mitigating the capital structure impact on 
FedEx’s valuation, thus, now, its EV, Free Cash Flow and ROIC reflect better FedEx’s core 
business. The FedEx operating leases are directly related to its express segment as they are 
mainly collateralized by aircrafts, thus, we estimate them to be 45% of FedEx Express revenues 
until FY31, in line with the last two years weights. 
Free Cash Flow  
The cash flow growth is a consequence of three key drivers: business growth, operating margins 
improvement, and lower investment requirements (as a % of revenues) compared to the past. 
FedEx prepared itself well in the last years to now reap the benefits, with all the investments and 
transformation it has made, from new hubs, optimizing all business segments to extending the 
operating days and other improvements. It is now better positioned in the market, making its 
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Table 4: FedEx Free Cash Flow Map 
Source: Own Estimates 
(in million dollars, as of May, 31st) FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
NOPLAT (capitalizing operating leases) 3 465 2 651 3 758 4 211 4 677 5 119 5 998 6 322 6 908 7 107 7 463 7 685
Depreciation and Amortization 3 353 3 615 3 970 4 105 4 279 4 502 4 567 4 675 4 798 4 949 5 098 5 251
Gross Cash Flow 6 818 6 266 7 729 8 316 8 955 9 621 10 566 10 997 11 706 12 057 12 561 12 936
Changes in NWCR (1 012) (404) 156 (270) (302) (40) 75 (192) 1 (150) (154) (159)
Capex, Net (5 564) (6 700) (5 119) (5 593) (6 187) (5 060) (5 487) (5 724) (6 091) (6 219) (6 407) (6 602)
Change in Rep. Operating Leases 0 (13 917) 13 917 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remove Change in Rep. Operating Leases 0 14 118 (14 118) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changes in Capitalized Operating Leases (30) 1 382 (1 158) (950) (725) (702) (642) (643) (655) (677) (700) (724)
Change in Other Assets, Net Other Liabilities 3 229 (69) 65 50 44 38 35 34 35 36 38
Change in Goodwill, Net 89 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Graph 9: Capital Expenditures and D&A 
Forecast  
Source: Own Estimates 
Cost of Capital 
▪ Capital Structure 
In recent years, FedEx saw its leverage ratios rising, reaching more than 50% total debt (includes 
net debt and operating leases) to enterprise value in FY20 (see graph 11). Regarding the last 
twelve months (LTM), FedEx has a total debt to enterprise value of 32.4% (see table 5) and we 
believe that FedEx will implicitly target this ratio. FedEx has been reducing its leverage ratio 
otherwise it could jeopardize its credit rating of BBB for the S&P and of Baa2 for Moody’s. It is 
important for FedEx to preserve this credit rating to keep the ability to raise debt in the future at 
attractive conditions. Note that since we estimate operating leases apart, the net debt to 
enterprise value will fluctuate but it will be such that the total debt to enterprise value will be equal 
to 32.4%. This will lead to different discount rates each year, although they are very similar. It is 
also worth mentioning that we consider the total book value of debt as a fair proxy of market value 
of debt. Also, in line with Damodaran's article3, we valued the operating leases as the present 
value of future rents on leases, discounted at an appropriate discount rate (Rol). We calculated 
the value of operating leases to uniformize ROICs across its comparable firms, but this must not 
have an impact on valuation.  
▪ Cost of Equity 
Since most of FedEx investors are American (79.7%), we assume that the FedEx marginal 
investor is also American. Thus, we use the S&P500 index as the market portfolio against which 
we regressed the FedEx historical stock returns to compute the levered beta (e) that we 
unlevered afterwards. We repeated this methodology for the selected peers and regressed using 
the respective market portfolio (e.g., in the case of DHL that most investors are European it was 
used as a market portfolio the STOXX 600) to compare the estimated systematic risk across the 
sector. The parameters for each firm and the respective unlevered betas (u) are summarized in 
table 6. 
To determine the cost of equity we used the CAPM model. Firstly, by re-levering the u of 0.88 
obtained through the average of the unlevered betas of FedEx, UPS and DHL (to reduce the 
statistical error of using only FedEx unlevered beta), we estimated a e of 1.26. Note that, 
considering the smaller size and the implied different service provided, we excluded XPO 
Logistics, J.B Hunts Transportation and the ZTO Express as from the 1st tier of FedEx’s 
comparable firms. Secondly, and to match the duration of FedEx’s cash flows duration, we used 
the 0.92% yield of a 10-year US government bond as a fair proxy for the risk-free rate. Thirdly, 
 
3 Damodaran, Aswath. 1999. “Dealing with operating leases in valuation.” NYU Working Paper  
Table 6: Unlevered Beta Computation 
Source: Bloomberg and Own Estimates 
Graph 11: FedEx Historical Capital 
Structure 
Source: Bloomberg, FedEx Annual 
Report and Own Estimates 
 
Source: Bloomberg, FedEx Annual 
Report and Own Estimates 
Operating Leases 16 498
Debt 23 318
Excess Cash 6 844
Debt and Debt Equivelents 32 972
Price per Share $259.62
Shares Outstanding (Millions) 265





Table 5: FedEx Target Capital Structure 
(in millions of $, except otherwise stated) 
(in millions of $, except DHL) FDX UPS DHL XPO JBHT ZTO Average
be 1.29 0.95 1.15 2.30 1.02 0.70
ND 16 474 16 879 15 002 6 870 984 0
E 68 818 145 560 50 461 10 900 14 440 25
OL 16 498 3 033 - - - -
EV 101 790 165 472 65 463 17 770 15 424 25
OL/E 24.0% 2.1% - - - -
D/E 23.9% 11.6% 29.7% 63.0% 6.8% -
implied bd 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.14 -
implied bol 0.08 0.08 - - - -
bu 0.90 0.84 0.91 1.52 0.97 0.70 0.88
according to Damodaran’s article4, we considered a 6.5% expected risk premium. In the end, we 
estimated an expected cost of equity (Re) of 9.13% each year. 
▪ Cost of Debt 
To compute FedEx’s expected cost of debt (Rd), we considered a FedEx corporate bond that 
matures in 2030 and with a principal of $750m and a yield-to-maturity of 1.70%. Then, based on 
Moody’s report, we assumed a loss given default of senior unsecured bonds of 68.18% and an 
annualized 10-years Baa2 probability of default of 0.31%, which led us to a Rd of 1.49%. 
Consequently, the implied d was 0.09.5 6 
▪ Cost of Operating Leases 
FedEx’s total debt is also composed by operating leases, mainly associated with aircrafts within 
FedEx Express. Until FY20, operating leases represented nearly half of total debt, hence, we 
believe that FedEx’s WACC must include the expected cost of operating leases (Rol) separately 
from the expected cost of debt in order to appropriately reflect this risk.  
According to Damodaran article, once operating leases are secured by a collateral (aircrafts), a 
yield of AA US composite bond is used as a fair proxy to determine the cost of operating leases 
(Rol). Therefore, considering a yield-to-maturity of 10-year AA US corporate bonds (1.45%), a 
loss given default of 40.24% and an annualized 10-years Aa2 probability of default of 0.08%, we 
estimate a Rol of 1.42%. Consequently, we reach to an implied ol of 0.08.3 5 6 
▪ WACC 
Firstly, we will consider a marginal tax rate of 24.15% (21% of corporate tax rate plus 3.15% of 
state and local income tax), assuming that Biden’s proposal to raise the corporate tax rate to 28% 
will not be approved by the US Senate. Secondly, from FY20 onwards, as mentioned before, 
FedEx will decrease its leverage ratio to the LTM level, thus, we expect that the equity-to-
enterprise value ratio will be kept at 67.6%, while the net debt to enterprise value and the 
operating leases to enterprise value ratios will tend to 17.8% and 14.6%, respectively, in the long-
term. Finally, with the after-tax cost of debt and operating leases, the cost of equity and the 
weights of debt-to-enterprise value which slightly vary across years, we computed a relatively 
stable WACC of 6.53%. 
Discount Cash Flow (DCF) 
 
To determine FedEx’s equity value as of December 31st, 2021, we deduct to the enterprise value 
both the total debt (including operating leases) and the postretirement liabilities, a non-core item 
that we estimate to be a percentage of salaries and employee benefits (tending to 14% by FY31). 
Consequently, we reach to an equity value of $75 944 million.  
 
4 Damodaran, Aswath. 2020. “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications – The 2020 Edition” NYU 
Working Paper 
5 Moody’s Annual Default Study 2020 
6 Bloomberg 
Operating EV 120 425
Net Debt (21 567)
Operating Leases (17 216)
Postretirement Pensions (5 699)
Equity Value 75 944
Shares Outstanding (millions) 265
Price Per Share (December 31st, 2021) $286.50
Table 8: Discounted Cash Flow Model  
Source: Own Estimates 
Table 7: WACC Computation (Long-Term) 
Source: Own Estimates 
   Rf 0.9%
   be 1.26







Marginal Tax Rate 24.15%
WACC 6.53%
WACC 
(in million dollars, as of 31st may) FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30
Unlevered Operating FCF 1 567 1 792 3 863 4 550 4 472 4 995 5 046 5 335 5 488
WACC 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53% 6.53%
Periods of Discount 0.42 1.42 2.42 3.42 4.42 5.42 6.42 7.42 8.42
Discount Factor 0.97 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.59
PV Unlevered Operating FCF 1 526 1 638 3 316 3 666 3 381 3 546 3 363 3 337 3 222
Terminal Value 159 134
Present Value Terminal Value 93 430
As summarized in table 8, using a DCF model, we estimate a price per share as of December 
31st, 2021 of $286.50. 
Terminal Value (TV)  
We computed the growth rate (g) to be the one that corresponds to a steady-state growth, in 
which the FCF growth (FCF g) matches the growth resulted from the product of the reinvestment 
rate (RR) and the return on new invested capital (RONIC). Therefore, we estimated g as a product 
of RONIC and RR. Moreover, the RR is relatively stable in the last years of the forecast period, 
thus, we can use the perpetuity formula.7 Note that, the 3% growth rate estimation is a fair 
estimation since it is between the US long-term inflation rate (2%) and the nominal US GDP 
growth (3.8%).  
Regarding RONIC, we consider it is going to stabilize in 10.4%, meaning that ROIC will tend to 
that value in the long run. FedEx has invested well in recent years to improve its efficiency, and 
it is possible to see its effects in a margin improvement in the last two quarters. Thus, we believe 
a 10.4% ROIC in the long-term is obtainable with all new investments as FedEx can converge its 
ROIC and margins to those of UPS, although it is very unlikely to fully reach UPS’s ROIC. 
Moreover, in our view, FedEx ROIC cannot converge to its cost of capital (WACC), given the 
tremendous high barriers there is to replicate FedEx business. Despite there is some competition 
in the logistics sector, there is no other company that offers the same services and coverage 
around the world as FedEx does, aside from UPS and DHL. Therefore, with a ROIC higher than 
WACC, FedEx will keep creating value to its shareholders. We want to highlight that ROIC was 
considered adjusted for operating leases as we want to isolate capital structure choices from the 
core business performance. 
Relative Valuation 
Regarding relative valuation, we consider that there are two groups of comparable firms. The Tier 
1 is composed by FedEx’s close comparable firms namely FedEx itself, UPS and DHL, due to 
similarities with FedEx in terms of business model, world presence and operating performance. 
In turn, the Tier 2 composed by XPO Logistics and J.B. Hunt Transport Services was selected 
according to their US presence and core business akin to FedEx’s.  
Therefore, using the last twelve months data of the Tier 1, we reached an EV-to-EBIT ranging 
from 17.6x to 23.2x, which corresponds to a price per share ranging from $190.67 to $303.88 as 
of December 31st, 2021. On the other hand, combining both peer groups we got to an enterprise 
value between 21.2x and 25.1x EV-to-EBIT, thus, we estimate the price per share to range from 
$264.02 to $343.74 as of December 31st, 2021. Nonetheless, we excluded from our analysis the 
second approach using both Tier 1 and Tier 2, because we believe that FedEx value should be 
 








Table 9: Growth Rate, RONIC and RR 
Source: Own Estimates 
(in million dollars, as of 31st May) FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31
NOPLAT 3 465 2 651 3 758 4 211 4 677 5 119 5 998 6 322 6 908 7 107 7 463 7 685 7 914
Invested Capital 58 002 59 167 61 588 64 232 67 116 68 372 69 820 71 670 73 583 75 644 77 772 79 968 82 236
FCF 304 1 486 1 338 1 567 1 792 3 863 4 550 4 472 4 995 5 046 5 335 5 488 5 646
ROIC (excl Goodwill) 7.2% 5.2% 7.1% 7.6% 8.1% 8.4% 9.7% 10.0% 10.6% 10.6% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8%
ROIC 6.3% 4.6% 6.4% 6.8% 7.3% 7.6% 8.8% 9.1% 9.6% 9.7% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9%
FCF g -279.0% 389.0% -10.0% 17.0% 14.0% 116.0% 18.0% -2.0% 12.0% 1.0% 6.0% 3.0% 3.0%
RONIC 4.3% -25.7% 95.0% 18.7% 17.6% 15.3% 70.0% 22.3% 31.7% 10.4% 17.3% 10.4% 10.4%
RR 91.2% 44.0% 64.4% 62.8% 61.7% 24.5% 24.1% 29.3% 27.7% 29.0% 28.5% 28.6% 28.7%
g 3.9% -11.3% 61.2% 11.7% 10.9% 3.8% 16.9% 6.5% 8.8% 3.0% 4.9% 3.0% 3.0%
NOPLAT g 4.5% -23.5% 41.7% 12.0% 11.1% 9.5% 17.2% 5.4% 9.3% 2.9% 5.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Table 10: Relative Valuation Multiples  
Source: Own Estimates 
(as of December 31st, 2020) EV/Revenues EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT
Tier 1
FDX 1.3x 9.6x 25.1x
UPS 2.1x 14.4x 21.2x
DHL 0.9x 7.3x 14.1x
Tier 2
XPO 1.1x 13.6x 48.7x
JBHT 1.6x 12.0x 21.7x
Tier 1 Average 1.4x 10.4x 20.1x
Tier 1 + 2 Average 1.4x 11.4x 26.2x
FedEx Implied Multiple by DCF 1.5x 12.7x 22.4x
assessed using the biggest logistics firms as peers, due to its dimension and strong market 
positioning. We used the EV-to-EBIT as the most accurate metric to assess FedEx value (instead 
of EV-to-EBITDA) due to the high depreciations within the logistics industry. We consider that 
they are a good proxy for future capital expenditures, since most of the upcoming investments 
are already planned (especially regarding aircraft fleet). 
Finally, we believe that the median multiple reached falls short of the fair multiple for FedEx since 
it has been outperforming the market (and we expect it to continue) during the pandemic crisis, 
exceeding investors’ expectations as a result of its efficient management during peak. On the 
other hand, the FedEx current multiple accounts for the stock sell-off, following the lower-than-
expected ground margin. Consequently, the market is heavily punishing FedEx for these results. 
However, we consider it an overreaction as FedEx has been beating all the estimates regarding 
the overall business. Accordingly, we believe that FedEx should be traded near 22.4x EV-to-
EBIT, the multiple implicit in our DCF valuation, to reflect FedEx’s fair market value. 
Sensitivity Analysis  
Firstly, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to the e and, consequently to the Re. Considering an 
interval of confidence at 95% for FedEx, UPS and DHL e8, we unlevered and then averaged 
their extreme values on that interval and re-levered for our sensitivity analysis, using FedEx future 
capital structure ratios. Therefore, we believe the possible values for e ranges from 0.99 to 1.53, 
translating into a cost of equity ranging from 7.38% and 9.97%, as it is summarized in table 11. 
Secondly, we performed a sensitivity analysis on Rd, in which the range of possible values fell 
within the FedEx YTM and an Rd estimation in the case of FedEx dropping from its current credit 
rating (Baa2 for its senior unsecured debt) to Baa3. As shown in table 12, the possible range for 
Rd has almost no impact on WACC. 
Thus, the WACC values could range from 5.33% to 7.13%, implying a price per share ranging 
from $526.08 to $219.34.  
Then, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to the Terminal Value. By varying the RONIC and RR, 
it was possible to come up with a reasonable range of values for the terminal value (table 15). It 
is worth to note that by varying the RONIC and RR, the Free Cash Flow that goes to the terminal 
value formula is different from the one determined by multiplying the free cash flow in the last 
year of the forecasting period by a (1+g) factor, making this sensitivity more accurate and 
consistent. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe how sensible the terminal value is to its key 
inputs (RONIC, RR and g).  
In addition, we assessed how sensitive g is, when we change RONIC and RR assumptions. The 
RR was varied by two times standard deviation of the last four years of the forecasting period. 
On the other hand, RONIC was varying from the WACC (6.53%) estimation (assuming in this 
case that RONIC was equal to WACC and, consequently, ROIC would tend to WACC, meaning 
that FedEx would not create nor destroy value) and the average of RONIC (12.13%) for the last 
3 years of the forecasting period. From this it is possible to obtain a plausible range for the 
perpetual growth rate (g), from 1.8%, slightly lower than the long-term goal for inflation in the US, 
to 3.5%, higher than the long-term inflation rate for the world but still lower than the nominal GDP 
growth for US and world. 
 
8 Confidence interval at 95%: [e - 2 x Standard Error; e + 2 x Standard Error] 
e 0.994 1.129 1.264 1.399 1.534
Re 7.38% 7.34% 8.22% 9.09% 9.97%
WACC 5.35% 5.32% 5.91% 6.51% 7.10%
Table 11: Cost of Equity (Re) Sensitivity 
Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
Table 13: WACC Sensitivity Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
#REF! 7.38% 7.34% 8.22% 9.9% 9.97%
1.38% 5.33% 5.33% 5.90% 6.49% 7.08%
1.46% 5.34% 5.34% 5.91% 6.50% 7.09%
1.54% 5.35% 5.35% 5.92% 6.51% 7.10%
1.62% 5.36% 5.36% 5.93% 6.52% 7.12%




Table 15: Terminal Value (TV) Sensitivity 
Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
g 2.5% 2.98% 3.5% 4,0% 4.5%
RONIC 9.9% 10.4% 10.9% 11.4% 11.9%
RR 25.2% 28.7% 32.1% 35.1% 37.8%
FCF 5 890 5 646 5 402 5 191 4 997
TV 146 106 159 146 178 218 205 053 245 971
Table 16: Growth (g) Sensitivity Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
6.53% 8.47% 10.41% 11.27% 12.13%
28.25% 1.8% 2.4% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4%
28.45% 1.9% 2.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4%
28.65% 1.9% 2.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5%
28.89% 1.9% 2.4% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5%




Table 12: Cost of Debt (Rd) Sensitivity 
Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
Rd 1.38% 1.46% 1.54% 1.62% 1.70%
WACC 6.52% 6.53% 6.54% 6.55% 6.56%
Table 14: Price Per Share - Sensitivity 
Analysis to WACC  
Source: Own Estimates 
5.33% 5.78% 6.53% 6.98% 7.13%
$526.08 $412.38 $286.50 $233.99 $219.34
WACC
Lastly, a sensitivity analysis to price per share disclosed how sensible the price was to changes 
in WACC and g. Note that the range of values we used for WACC and g was determined 
previously by sensitivity analysis made to these two inputs. It is likely that the price per share 
would be concentrated in the intervals where g is above 2%, in line with US long-term inflation 
rate. However, the impact on share price is still high (see table 17), showing once again how 
sensible the DCF model is to its inputs.  
Scenario Analysis  
▪ Best-Case Scenario  
In our “blue sky” scenario, we incorporate 7 main different assumptions: faster and higher than 
expected economic recovery; a more favorable international trade; FedEx would be also 
responsible for distributing the vaccine around the world; the e-commerce demand would be 
higher and the high growth rate would last more years; greater operating margin efficiency in the 
3 main business segments; lower capital requirements (as a % of revenues); and higher RONIC 
in the long-run. 
Despite we expect GDP levels to be back to pre-COVID by 2021, in this scenario we assume a 
faster reopening of the economies around the world that would translate into higher B2B 
transactions. This along with a more favorable international trade would benefit FedEx in 2 ways: 
increasing its revenues and increasing its operating margins (given that B2B segment tends to 
be more profitable than B2C segments). 
Secondly, FedEx would be responsible for the worldwide distribution of the vaccine, increasing 
revenues and enhancing the FedEx’s reputation. 
Furthermore, we assume that ground segment would continue to grow at double-digit due to e-
commerce lasting growth. E-commerce still only represents a small fraction of retail sales and so 
FedEx can still benefit from this huge upside potential. With all investments FedEx has made 
along with the future ones, extending FedEx’s capacity, the ground segment can benefit from a 
lasting e-commerce growth. Thus, we forecast 9.6% CAGR20-25 (vs 8.3% in the base-case). 
Additionally, in this scenario, we assume that the management team could deliver their long-term 
goal: more than 10% EBIT Margin. For this, we assumed FedEx Express would exceed a 10% 
margin, surpassing investors’ expectations for this segment. Also, we assume FedEx Ground 
would increase its operating margin to historical levels, in the mid-teens and at a faster pace. This 
would be possible as a mix of B2B transaction recovery and increased B2C segment efficiency. 
Lastly, the results achieved in the last quarters for Freight segment would not be a “one-off” thing. 
Meaning that FedEx Freight “push for revenue quality” strategy would extend to the whole 
forecasting period, with margins always above 13%. 
Despite still making large investments, mainly in the ground segment to accommodate the huge 
e-commerce demand, we assume a better asset efficiency (41% vs 43% PP&E over revenue in 
the long-run) than in our base-case.  
Therefore, due to better operating and capital efficiency, we assume a higher long-term RONIC 
(12.2% vs 10.4%). For the same WACC, FedEx would create more value to its shareholders than 
in the base case. Thus, our implied price for this scenario would be $376.27 per share. 
▪ Worst-Case Scenario  
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Graph 14: Best-Case Scenario Revenues 
and Operating Margin Forecast  






Terminal Value 199 560
Enterprise Value (FY21) 149 926
Price Per Share $376.27
Table 18: Best-Case Scenario Results  
Source: Own Estimates 
Table 17: WACC and Growth (g) 
Sensitivity Analysis  
Source: Own Estimates 
##### 5.33% 5.78% 6.53% 6.98% 7.13%
1.8% $390.06 $322.41 $238.40 $200.06 $189.00
2.4% $445.01 $359.97 $259.27 $215.03 $202.45
3.0% $526.13 $412.41 $286.50 $234.00 $219.34
3.3% $580.72 $445.86 $302.90 $245.07 $229.13
3.5% $651.76 $487.32 $322.16 $257.83 $240.35
WACC
g
more restrictions imposed by governments may be raised to non-essential business activities 
throughout the world. Allied to an increasing economic uncertainty and investments contraction, 
these factors could negatively impact the world economic growth as well as the global trade. 
Furthermore, FedEx’s operating costs are greatly driven by fuel costs, especially within FedEx 
Express, hence, in this adverse scenario we are estimating higher fuel costs as a result of an 
unsuccessful hedging strategy. In addition, the worst-case scenario considers an increase of the 
marginal tax rate to 31% (against 24.2% in the base-case), assuming that the electoral proposal 
of Biden to raise the corporate tax rate to 28% is approved. Accordingly, FedEx may face a heavily 
decrease in operating margins as a consequence of the lower revenue growth and increased 
operating and income tax costs.  
Regarding FedEx Express, we are assuming that FedEx may not be assigned to the worldwide 
distribution of the vaccine. On the other hand, we are also assuming that TNT integration within 
the express network may take longer than projected (FY22) due to the potential pandemic 
constraints in Europe, affecting the international segments of FedEx Express. Also, considering 
the 2017 cyberattack to TNT, this scenario weighs the risks of information breaches and failed 
technological integration within FedEx Express network, that could require additional capital, 
threatening FedEx investments strategy. Moreover, the pandemic raised restrictions to 
commercial flights which carried not only passengers but also belly cargo. Consequently, in the 
worst-case scenario, although the gain in market share until FY23/24, this could not be sustained 
thereafter, as passenger flights recover their “normal” activity, pressuring margin down. As a 
result, we expect FedEx revenues to grow at a 3.5% CAGR20-25 (vs 4.3% in base-case) and to 
have a lower EBIT margin tending to 7.4% by FY31 (vs 9.5% in base-case). 
Secondly, the boom in e-commerce may not be sustained in the worst case, hence, FedEx 
Ground may face a decrease in revenues growth due to a potential decline in projected e-
commerce growth and the slowdown in the US economy for the next years. At the same time, as 
a result of the increasing weight of B2C transactions, we are assuming that labor costs will be 
kept at a high percentage of sales in the short-term, deteriorating the ground margin. Moreover, 
the investments in facilities and equipment to optimize the ground network may not be monetized 
in the short-term. Therefore, we estimate FedEx Ground revenues to grow at a 6.8% CAGR20-25 
(vs 8.3% in base-case), while operating margin would not exceed 10% by FY31.  
Thirdly, we are varying FedEx Freight's revenues and operating margin forecasts downwards, 
assuming FY21 as an abnormal year with 12.9% of EBIT margin. Thus, thereafter, we assume 
FedEx Freight’s revenues to grow at a 2.9% CAGR20-25 (vs 3.6% in base-case) while the operating 
margin would trend to past levels, reaching only an 8% operating margin by FY31. 
In addition to the above-mentioned variations, this scenario also foresees a slight deterioration of 
FedEx's operational efficiency, meaning that we are assuming that FedEx will need to raise 
capital expenditures and operating leases to reach the planned sales level. Hence, the net PPE 
will tend to 45% of total revenues, while capitalized operating leases will be 46% of Express 
revenues by FY31 (compared to 43% and 45% in the base case scenario, respectively). 
In the end, this scenario has an implicit long-term ROIC of 6.8% which against a 6.50% WACC 
(lower than in the base-case due to higher marginal tax rate) reveals that, in our “bear” scenario, 
FedEx barely creates value to shareholders, assuming that the strong competition will almost 
eliminate the abnormal return. Therefore, we estimate an implied price per share of $123.28, 
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Graph 15: Worst-Case Scenario Revenues 
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Graph 16: Worst-Case Scenario 
Operating Margins 
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Graph 17: Worst-Case Scenario Revenues 
and Operating Margin Forecast 






Terminal Value 89 225
Enterprise Value (FY21) 67 898
Price Per Share $123.28
Table 19: Worst-Case Scenario Results 
Source: Own Estimates 
Final Recommendation 
According to our DCF valuation, FedEx will be traded at $286.50 as of December 31st, 2021. 
Note that we believe the DCF method is the most appropriate to assess the fair value of FedEx’s 
stock, otherwise we would have to consider a premium to reflect the outstanding market 
performance of FedEx. Additionally, as a result of the restriction to raise dividends until May 2021 
imposed by Credit Agreements, we expect FedEx to pay $0.65 quarterly dividends, which 
amounts to an annual dividend of $2.60 per share. Therefore, as of January 4th, 2021 our final 
recommendation is to buy FedEx’s stock, with an expected total shareholder return of 11.4% 
















Graph 18: FedEx Football Field 
Source: Own Estimates 
